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Abstract
Digital data have become a form of “objectivation”, which affect how we construct social knowledge and organize social
space (Couldry & Hepp, 2017). The workplace is one sphere that is increasingly datafied. This study explores how Uber
drivers, a form of digitally-enabled service workers, contribute to the normalization of the social production of space
through their interpretative practices of digital data in an online forum. Drawing on Uber’s corporate discourse and an
Uber driver online forum, we analyze two facets of the Uber app and drivers’ mediated experiences: (1) the quantification
and discipline of drivers’ performance through Uber’s rating system and (2) the coordination of spatial movement through
location-related metrics. We argue that the underlying workings of the Uber app premediate expectations of service en-
counters and spatial movement. Uber drivers meanwhile develop practices which respond to and circumvent their own
data contributions to the system. Drivers’ practices, we argue, are largely in compliance with the calculative logics set by
Uber. The article addresses implications of Uber drivers’ practices for the reproduction of social space and power-relations
in digitally-enabled service work and the gig economy.
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1. Introduction
Datafication is the latest wave of mediatization, a wave
that is deepening people’s connectedness to data-driven
infrastructures of communication—or what Couldry and
Hepp (2017) call “deep mediatization”. The ways that we
make sense of reality, construct social knowledge and
organize social space are intimately connected to digi-
tal data. The workplace is one sphere that is increasingly
dataifed: not only do knowledge workers need to work
with data and algorithms, but service workers are also in-
creasingly required to interpret and use data in their daily
work. The proliferation of digital and mobile technolo-
gies has rendered a variety of labor in the global digital
economy—from data-entry workers to electronic work-
ers to unpaid consumption labor—largely low paid or un-
paid and invisible (Dyer-Witheford, 2015; Huws, 2014;
Scholz, 2017). The expansion of gig economy is part of
this broader context: inequality and precarity are deeply
embedded in the gig economy (Chen, 2017; Schor &
Attwood-Charles, 2017; van Doorn, 2017). Against the
backdrop of datafication and the gig economy, this study
takes Uber as a case to explore how Uber drivers in-
terpret the data generated through Uber mobile appli-
cation (app) to mediate power-relations between the
company, drivers, and riders. We use the term “digitally-
enabled service workers” to refer to workers who inter-
act with consumers virtually before meeting in the physi-
cal space. Like taxi drivers (Anderson, 2014; Davis, 1959)
and other traditional service workers (Leidner, 1999),
digitally-enabled service workers need to evaluate in-
teractional contexts, and thus manage emotional dis-
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plays during service encounters. Scholars have studied
the power-relations between service workers and con-
sumers (e.g., Leidner, 1999; Lopez, 2010) and the instru-
mentality and socio-economic forces of performing affec-
tive or emotional labor (e.g., Duffy, 2016; Gregg, 2010;
Hearn, 2010; Hochschild, 1983). Yet, central to the no-
tion of digitally-enabled service workers is the tempo-
ral ordering of social interactions. The temporality is es-
sential to the mediatization of social space in two im-
portant respects. First, data set expectations of social
interactions. Second, data as a kind of social stock of
knowledge (Couldry & Hepp, 2017) may exercise control
over drivers’ work practices, whereas drivers may also
develop practices to negotiate what counts as relevant
“knowledge” in the gig economy.
An investigation into how Uber drivers interpret data
helps to understand the production of social space be-
cause people access and use the Uber app with their
mobile phones in the public space. We draw on Jans-
son’s (2013) framework ofmediatization and social space
to explore the “transmedia textures” of Uber from the
drivers’ perspective. Echoing Humphreys’ (2012) obser-
vations of mobile social networks, the use of Uber
app connects drivers with riders who are not physically
present, coordinates users’ spatial movement, and cata-
logues metaspatial information about users of the app.
As such, Uber drivers become a node within physical and
datafied space. Uber drivers interact with riders in phys-
ical space and data generated through the app by con-
tinually sharing personal and locational information with
other users and the company. Digital data and associ-
ated algorithms are socially constructed artifacts (Gille-
spie, 2014) that are built into drivers’ work practices.
While much research has examined the governance
by digital data in the workplace (e.g., Rosenblat & Stark,
2016) and the ways that knowledge workers respond
to dataifcation (e.g., Christin, 2017), this study explores
digitally-enabled service workers’ interpretative practice
of data. Here, interpretative practice means the ways
that Uber drivers articulate norms guiding their peers in
engaging with data on an online forum where they build
communication networks (Rosenblat, 2018). Such prac-
tices can contribute to the normalization of the social
production of space (Jansson, 2013). We scrutinize how
Uber’s corporate discourse and Uber drivers’ practices of
knowledge sharing ascribemeanings to the data concern-
ing physical space and their social interactions therein.
This case study affords significant opportunities for think-
ing about the digitally-enabled service workers’ labor ex-
perience and the socio-technical context where they in-
teract with the platform, the company, and riders.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Mediatization and Social Space
Theoretically, we explore how Uber contributes to the
production of social space. Jansson’s (2013) framework
on the mediatization of social space is especially helpful
in conceptualizing Uber and the mediatization of social
space. He uses Lefebvre’s (1991) triadic understanding
for social space, that is, space is produced through per-
ception, conception, and lived practice. Jansson (2013)
mediatizes this triadic frame to account for the contem-
porary transmedia environment we live in today. He
argues that perceived space “directs our attention to-
wards the more material, sensuous dimensions of the
media” (p. 282), that is, in a transmedia world, per-
ceived space takes onmaterial indispensability and adap-
tation. Within the context of this study, we will examine
how Uber drivers perceive space through their interac-
tionswith the Uber app. According to Jansson, conceived
space can be best understood through the premediation
of experience and expectations. This suggests an atten-
tion to the ways that the experience of space is preme-
diated for drivers (as well as riders). Important to Lefeb-
vre’s notion of conceived space are power differentials.
That is, some actors have more power than others in
defining and shaping what space is and how it is used
(Harvey, 1990). For example, Uber has its own navigation
system that is directly embedded within the Uber driver
app. This navigation system is an example of the kinds
of premediated, conceived spaces which are essential to
the infrastructure of Uber as both an app and a company.
It essentially premediates the coordination of driver and
rider such that onemust use the app to summon a driver.
Lastly, and of great relevance to this article, is Jans-
son’s (2013) normalization of social practice.Most similar
to Lefebvre’s (1991) lived experience, this concept helps
to understand howUber drivers seek to influence the pro-
duction of space through their appropriation of Uber app,
its various features and various other media used in con-
cert. Jansson draws our attention to the normalization
of social practice, that is, how space is produced through
the “norms, conventions and expectations” of everyday
life (2013, p. 285). Therefore, to study not just spatial
practice, but it’s normalization, we empirically examine
as one of our data sources an online drivers’ forumwhere
such normalization is explicitly articulated rather than in-
ferred from ethnographic observation.
The question of the mediatization of social space
within the case of Uber requires not only definitions of
what we mean social space but mechanisms within me-
diatization that more specifically contribute to the study
of Uber. In this case, datafication.
2.2. The Politics of Data
Data and associated algorithms can be inherently politi-
cal artifacts because they can produce and objectify cer-
tain logics of social knowledge (Couldry & Hepp, 2017;
Gillespie, 2014). Gillespie (2014) has argued algorithms
evaluate and recommend “relevant” information to the
users, based on their implicit assumptions and values
about what counts as “legitimate” knowledge. Because
algorithms cannot achieve its ends without users’ prac-
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tices, we should examine the “entanglement between
algorithms put into practice and the social tactics of
users who take them up” in broader socio-technical con-
texts (Gillespie, 2014, p. 183). An examination of entan-
glement with practice has to do with the interpretative
agency of users in negotiating meanings of data. Couldry
and Hepp (2017) have explicated that datafication is an
emerging wave of mediatization because data become a
form of “objectivation” that affects howwe construct so-
cial reality, though people may not be aware of the auto-
mated processes of classifying and categorizing the data.
They argue data can be translated into social practices
through the organization of social space, time, self, col-
lectivities, and social order.
This study focuses on the intersection of data and so-
cial production of space. The Uber app not only catego-
rizes and segregates physical space through algorithms
but also becomes the means to coordinate drivers’ and
riders’ spatial movement, trace their spatially relevant in-
formation, and encounter other users. Uber’s rating sys-
tem also produces “calculated publics” (Gillespie, 2014)
by categorizing drivers and riders into different groups
on a five-star scale. As such, the data generated via Uber
app, which embody Uber’s implicit assumptions about
social knowledge, may affect drivers’ interpretation of
space and interactions therein. But Uber drivers must
consider how they react to data. Do they consider the
data as a formof social knowledge that shapes their inter-
pretation of physical space and social interactions with
riders? How do drivers interpret the data for their pur-
poses? This study may provide a glimpse of these issues
and contribute to the literature on the mediatization of
social space.
2.3. Datafication of the Workplace and Workers’
Autonomy
The datafication of the workplace involves processes
through which employers and workers negotiate what
counts as “knowledge” in making work-related decisions
(Stark, 2009). Braverman (1974) has highlighted a com-
plex relationship betweenworkers’ skills, knowledge, job
autonomy and managerial control. Managerial control
is executed through the abstraction of and “monopoly
over knowledge” (Braverman, 1974, p. 82). This form
of control concentrates the ownership of production
knowledge in the hands of employers and excludes work-
ers from this process. Braverman’s work offers precious
insights into the labor power of knowledge and the
dynamics of control and resistance. Recently, corpora-
tions deploy data-driven technologies to restructure la-
bor process through the abstraction of data and knowl-
edge (Levy, 2015). Therefore, an investigation into the
relationship between labor process and datafication as
knowledge production can help to understand power dy-
namics in the digital economy.
Existing research largely have examined how knowl-
edgeworkers—for example, journalists (Anderson, 2011;
Carlson, 2017; Christin, 2017), legal experts (Christin,
2017), medical professionals (Maiers, 2017) and edu-
cators (Sauder & Espeland, 2009)—respond to the in-
stitutional demand for algorithmic decision-making. An
underlying premise is that algorithms can make more
“objective” and “rational” judgment that humans, from
the management’s perspective (Carlson, 2017; Christin,
2017). Data become a form of quantifiable knowledge
that may change workers’ decision-making process. For
instance, managers ask journalists to make news deci-
sions based on web traffic statistics (Anderson, 2011)
and use algorithms to produce, prioritize, and recom-
mend news to their readers (Carlson, 2017). Yet, there
are discrepancies between organizational policies and
workers’ actual practices. Christin (2017) found that jour-
nalists and legal professionals develop buffering strate-
gies to resist such technologies. The workers may simply
ignore the metrics generated by the technologies, selec-
tively manipulate the data for their goals, and criticize
the validity of the data.
Organizational culture and professional agency can
affect how people interpret data and knowledge within
their professions. For example, Maiers (2017) found a
tension between quantifiable metrics created by Hori-
zon, a data-driven medical technology, and clinicians’
tacit knowledge. Although clinicians recognize the value
of Horizon, they do not take the data as the only le-
gitimate knowledge. Rather, they may engage in “con-
ditioned reading”, by tracking both the data and other
indicators of patient health in the decision-making pro-
cess. “Conditioned reading” of data is possible in orga-
nizational contexts which recognize the agency of work-
ers to draw on their expertise. As such, knowledge work-
ers’ professional expertise becomes a vital source of
job autonomy.
White collar workers, however, may be very different
from low-wage service workers in labor conditions and
experiences. Employers reportedly discipline low-wage
workers through a system of scientific management (Ball,
2010; Braverman, 1974), refractive surveillance (Levy &
Barocas, 2018) and automated surveillance (Levy, 2015;
Moore, Upchurch, & Whittaker, 2018; Rosenblat & Stark,
2016). For example, Levy (2015) found that truck firms
used real-time fleet management systems to create ab-
stract data streams to constantly monitor drivers’ work
schedule, geolocation, and duty status. Such managerial
practice considered truck drivers as a mere data point in
the technological system, thus allowing themanagement
to control workers’ spatialmovement in time. Hence, low-
wage service workers have limited job autonomy (van
Doorn, 2017). This raises the questions of how service
workers may imagine and respond to the datafication.
We argue that Braverman’s (1974) discussion of
managerial control as the abstraction and monopoly of
knowledge is particularly relevant to datafication, labor
process and power dynamics in service work. Recent
studies have complicated the emotional labor process
by recognizing the labor subjectivity and struggles to
Media and Communication, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 2, Pages 29–38 31
perform emotion work contingent upon organizational
and situational demands and worker-consumer relation-
ship in service work (Bolton, 2010; Lopez, 2010). In the
context of Uber, we should consider who has more
power to define the norms of service interactions. Ad-
ditionally, Levy and Barocas (2018) have developed the
framework of refractive surveillance to situate consumer
surveillance and worker control relationally, particularly
in the low-wage retail workplace. Corporations deploy
consumer data, such as customer in-store experiences,
to make decisions as to the management of employ-
ees work hours and scheduling. It helps to understand
how Uber’s consumer-sourced rating system may exer-
cise power over drivers. Drawing insights from these
studies, we examine how digital data shape Uber drivers’
interpretative practices and the labor process in the age
of deep mediatization.
2.4. Uber Drivers in the Gig Economy
Over the last decade, there has been a skyrocketing
growth of the so-called “gig” or “sharing” economy that
deploys algorithmic technologies to manage and orga-
nizework (Scholz, 2017). The on-demandplatforms, such
as Uber, consider both service providers and consumers
as users of their services, which allow the companies
to distance themselves from an employment relation-
ship with service providers (e.g., Uber drivers) and asso-
ciated obligations (van Doorn, 2017). The construction of
platforms may also aggravate class, racial and gender in-
equalities during service encounters (Schor & Attwood-
Charles, 2017) and result in workplace discrimination
(Rosenblat, Levy, Barocas, & Hwang, 2017). Situating in
the wider context of precarious workforce, the gig econ-
omy can be seen “an opportunity to increase labor con-
trol while externalizing risks onto contractors and cus-
tomers” (Schor & Attwood-Charles, 2017, p. 7). Similarly,
Fleming (2017) has argued that there is a “radical re-
sponsibilization” of work, which is intimately connected
with neoliberal discourse that emphasizes individual re-
sponsibility and choice. The discourse may normalize gig
workers’ precarious experiences. Moreover, despite the
platform owners’ glamorization of flexibility of gig work-
ers, workers are subject to expansive socio-technical con-
trol (van Doorn, 2017) through information asymmetries
(Rosenblat & Stark, 2016; Shapiro, 2017). The platforms
can create information asymmetries through selective
display of relevant work-related information. In a study
of on-demand courier services, Shapiro (2017) found
that the companies remove locational information in the
app interface, which delimits gig workers’ abilities to de-
cidewhether to accept job orders. Yet, Shapiro notes that
gig workers’ intuitions and experiencesmight affect their
interpretation of data in making decisions. Therefore, it
is crucial to understand how gig workers may normalize
and entangle with the calculative logics of algorithms.
Studies on Uber drivers have extended critiques of
labor practices in the gig economy, by examining how
Uber app may facilitate automated algorithmic manage-
ment of labor (Gloss, McGregor, & Brown, 2016; Lee,
Kusbit, Metsky, & Dabbish, 2015; Rosenblat & Stark,
2016). The app’s navigation and rating systems enable
constant surveillance of drivers. Because the potentially
biased ratings determine drivers’ employment opportu-
nities (Rosenblat et al., 2017), the rating system lead
drivers to perform emotional labor for an exchange of
a good rating (Gloss et al., 2016; Raval & Dourish, 2016;
Rosenblat & Stark, 2016). Due to the information asym-
metries between the company and drivers, drivers often
expressed frustration with the data generated via Uber
app, which necessitate learning how to interpret such
data (Gloss et al., 2016; Malin & Chandler, 2017; Raval
& Dourish, 2016; Rosenblat & Stark, 2016).
These studies provide valuable insights into the la-
bor control and practices in the gig economy and the
governing role of Uber app, but few of them explicated
how the service encounters are mediatizated through
the datafication of drivers’ performance and physical
location. Therefore, we examine how drivers articulate
norms of interpreting the data generated via Uber app
to construct social space and shape interactions between
drivers, riders, and the platform itself.
3. Research Context and Methods
Uber, founded in 2009, is one of the largest ride-hailing
service companies. In 2017, there were 3 million active
drivers globally (Bhuiyan, 2018). Using Uber app, Uber
drivers can provide ride-hailing services to other users
who request a ride. The app monitors users’ locations
and performance metrics in real-time contexts. Echoing
Bowker and Star’s (1999) discussion of classification sys-
tems, we argue that the data generated and exhibited
through the app are always incomplete and conduct in-
visible work to organize drivers’ work in social space.
This study focuses on two facets of drivers’ mediated
experiences, namely the rating system and the naviga-
tion system.
Methodologically, the construction of algorithmic
systems is largely black boxed because platform own-
ers prohibit individuals from accessing the design pro-
cess and the algorithms are always evolving. A discursive
analysis of platform owner’ documents and different ac-
tors’ interpretative practices is a useful strategy to un-
derstand algorithmic systems (Kitchin, 2017). Specifically,
the materials presented in this article draw on (1) Uber’s
website and (2) online forum for Uber drivers. We an-
alyzed the company documents concerning the rating
system and navigation system to understand how Uber
has framed the two systems and intended users’ action.
We also draw on UberPeople, one of the largest online
Uber driver forums. By December 2017, the online fo-
rum had about 110,000 members and 198,000 discus-
sion posts, where drivers discuss the strategies for eco-
nomic success. We do not intend to generalize drivers’
practices of knowledge sharing on this forum to the ac-
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tual work practices of the whole population of Uber
drivers. Yet, because the forum represents a place where
drivers share work-related knowledge (Rosenblat, 2018),
our analysis of the forum discussion may reveal how
some drivers articulate norms and expectations of digi-
tal data through their practices of sharing peer-to-peer
knowledge. We conducted a purposive sampling (Coyne,
1997) of discussion threads, specifically focusing on two
of the thirteenmain discussions threads on the site: “Rat-
ings” and “Advice”. We analyzed the most-viewed post
on the “Ratings” thread (i.e., more than 100,000 views)
to explore how drivers interpret and manage the rating
system. Within “Advice”, we examined the “Beginner Ad-
vice” posted by the moderator of this forum, which may
help us to understand how drivers articulate their knowl-
edge about the data with other drivers. A comparison be-
tween Uber’s documents and drivers’ posts reveals dis-
crepancies between Uber’s policy and drivers’ interpre-
tative practices as well as the negotiation of legitimate
knowledge around service encounters.
4. The Management of an “Imperfect” System
As an algorithmic labor management system (Rosenblat
& Stark, 2016), Uber app is an “imperfect” system be-
cause it can never fully control drivers’ performance.
Based on the materials we collected, Uber and drivers
negotiate the meanings of the data generated via the
rating system and the aggregated location-related met-
rics. There are two recurrent themes surrounding the use
of Uber app and datafication: (1) the quantification and
discipline of drivers’ performance and (2) the coordina-
tion of spatial movement. Examples within each theme
demonstrate how the digital data mediate the social pro-
duction of space and the power-relations between Uber
and drivers.
4.1. The Quantification and Discipline of Drivers’
Performance
Uber’s rating system allows drivers and riders to evaluate
one another’s performance after each trip on a generic
5-point star system. One’s overall rating is an average of
the ratings she or he got from the last 500 trips. Uber
drivers are required to rate riders’ performance after
each trip, whereas riders can decide whether they rate
their drivers. The consumer-sourced rating system offers
a mechanism for Uber to measure drivers’ performance
and legitimize their decisions on who can continue work-
ing on the platform. However, Uber enforces a stricter
regulation on drivers than riders because Uber does not
deactivate riders’ account even they get a poor rating.
Uber’s rating system can be seen as disciplinary prac-
tices that exercise power through surveillance and nor-
malization (Sauder & Espeland, 2009). Uber not only
continuously monitors drivers’ performance through the
real-time rating system (Rosenblat & Stark, 2016) but
also disciplines drivers to keep track of their quanti-
fied performance. The rating system normalizes such dis-
cipline by standardizing the “ideal” ride-hailing experi-
ences and creating the normative hierarchy (Sauder &
Espeland, 2009). The rating system situates drivers’ per-
formance relationally: a driver’s rating reflects not only
one’s performance but also the extent to which one’s
performance conforms to the standard norms of “ideal”
performance held by other drivers. Because the mean-
ings of one’s numeric star rating are abstract, Uber sent a
guide to the drivers to explain themethods of calculating
ratings, the goals of using the rating system, and strate-
gies for getting a good rating in 2014. This official guide
documents how drivers should perform during the ride.
The guide explained, “Your [drivers’] average rating is the
first thing that Uber uses when evaluating your [drivers’]
partnership and the system” (Uber, 2014, p. 2). Uber
may deactivate the “lowest-quality drivers” to protect
“the quality of the Uber system as a whole” and ensure
that riders can enjoy an efficient and safe ride-hailing
service (Uber, 2014, p. 3). This document also provides
some guidelines for getting a high rating. Specifically,
drivers should “offer riders bottled water, snacks, gum,
and cell phone chargers” and have a clean car (Uber,
2014, p. 8). The drivers should also perform emotional
labor by dressing professionally and being “friendly and
positive, regardless of the rider’s attitude” (Uber, 2014,
p. 10). In 2017, Uber’s website included these sugges-
tions and added that drivers should “keep the conversa-
tion polite, professional, and respectful” and be “socia-
ble” (Uber Help, 2017).
Uber’s suggestions are relevant to the mediatiza-
tion of social interactions through datafication. The ag-
gregated consumer-sourced ratings become the medi-
ated knowledge that provides personalized recommen-
dations to drivers and Uber about drivers’ work perfor-
mance. Because drivers’ rating determines their employ-
ment opportunities, they have to discipline their perfor-
mance to get high ratings. The Uber’s guideline also en-
visions that drivers’ interactions with riders should facili-
tate an efficient, safe, and communal trip. The rating sys-
tem thus becomes a form of “feeling rules” (Hochschild,
1983; Leidner, 1999) that standardize and control how
drivers should interact with riders in both mediated and
face-to-face communication. The system also structures
drivers’ feelings and monetizes affective relationships
into a formof digital reputation (Hearn, 2010). The instru-
mentality of affective relationships is not new; for exam-
ple, taxi drivers have long managed their affective rela-
tionshipswith passengers to solicit tips (Davis, 1959). The
difference is that Uber possesses much more informa-
tion about service encounters than drivers and can use
the information to script drivers’ performance through
the deployment of data-driven technologies (Levy, 2015).
Hence, drivers have limited degree of autonomy in decid-
ing their performance during service encounters.
Indeed, Uber drivers may socialize themselves to the
standard created by Uber’s rating system. On UberPeo-
ple, there are heated discussions on the tactics of get-
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ting a good rating. Participants consider drivers as vulner-
able subjects because riders can unreasonably give them
a low rating and there is no formal procedure for drivers
to complain about the ratings. The uncertainty and anxi-
ety created by the rating system are related to the data’s
disciplinary power because drivers have limited power
to manage the evaluative process (Sauder & Espeland,
2009). Thus, drivers attempt to comply with the expec-
tations created by the system. Specifically, some partici-
pants recommended others to follow Uber’s suggestions
to dress professionally and learn how to communicate
with riders in a friendly way. In a discussion post with
more than 600 replies, participants suggested that “if
there are more than one passenger in the car, be sure
to engage them all equally in conversation”. When more
than one rider enters the car, drivers cannot know who
will be rating them. Engaging all passengersmitigates this
uncertainty. Drivers should also know when they should
be “quiet” or “chatty” by observing riders’ performance
and body language. It also means that drivers should
not talk about sensitive topics such as politics because it
may negatively affect the rating. Like Uber’s suggestions,
participants recommended that drivers should offer bot-
tled water and phone chargers to riders. These sugges-
tions may normalize the meanings Uber scripts into its
rating system; that is, drivers conform to the algorithmic
power by learning to be “professional” and “sociable”
service workers.
Unlike professional workers (Christin, 2017), drivers
work in a highly constrained environment where they
cannot simply ignore data and have limited autonomy
to interpret data. The forum provides drivers with an op-
portunity to denounce the limited transparency and un-
fairness of Uber’s rating system. On UberPeople, partici-
pants suggested that there are various reasons for a poor
rating, based on their work experience. They explained
that young people, nighttime riders, and the drunk are
more likely to give low ratings. The working time and lo-
cations are vital to their ratings because if drivers mostly
work in a “party city at night”, they tend to get a poor
rating. One participant stated:
I intend to be a full driver and make a lot of money
for this company and don’t feel drivers should have
to live in fear of losing an account over the actions of
the intoxicated. Please look at the rating system and
allow it to give us a chance to grow rather than live
in fear.
The consequence of getting a poor rating is the pro-
hibition of working on Uber. The rating system thus
datafies the social interaction as well as the physical ve-
hicular space, which can contribute to a drivers’ perpet-
ual state of fear. Because drivers cannot continue work-
ing through Uber if their rating is below about 4.6/5.0,
one to four stars is regarded as failing grade. Drivers con-
tended that Uber should educate riders about the rating
system. Other drivers stated that the rating system is po-
tentially biased because the system elevates riders’ eval-
uation over drivers’ unique work experiences. Yet, riders
may have implicit biases when they evaluate drivers’ per-
formance; for example, they may tend to give a low rat-
ing if the driver already has a poor rating. The imperfect
navigation system can also result in an unsatisfactory rat-
ing. Because drivers do not control the rating system by
which they are evaluated, forum participants closely at-
tend to the details of the system. This in turn reveals how
they internalize the system as a form of discipline.
Another strategy of managing the rating system is
“gaming”, which is defined as “cynical efforts to manipu-
late the rankings data without addressing the underlying
condition that is the target of measurement” (Sauder &
Espeland, 2009, p. 76). For Uber drivers, a gaming strat-
egy is not accepting certain riders’ request, based on
riders’ location and performance metrics. When drivers
receive a ride request, the app will show the time dis-
tance between drivers’ location and the pick-up loca-
tion. Participants on UberPeople proposed that drivers
should not accept a ride that is more than eight min-
utes away from their current location because when rid-
ers wait for a long time, they are more likely to rate
the drivers low.Moreover, forum participants contended
that drivers should not accept riders with a rating be-
low 4.7/5.0 because these riders are usually “trouble-
some” and less likely to tip the drivers. Uber never sug-
gests that drivers can select a rider based on the rat-
ings or location-related data. Yet, drivers appropriate the
system to protect their employment opportunities. Al-
though drivers are vocal in their criticismof the rating sys-
tem, they nevertheless legitimize the system by ascrib-
ing social meanings (e.g., troublesome) to riders with a
substandard rating. In all, the rating system becomes a
datafied form of discipline that shapes how drivers inter-
act with the platform and riders. Simultaneously drivers
develop interpretative practices that utilize the data to
sustain their livelihood.
4.2. The Coordination of Spatial Movement
One common way for drivers to use the Uber app to
connect with place was to use the navigation system.
The app includes the GPS navigation system, but drivers
can also use other systems to navigate their route such
as Google Maps. The navigation system not only is a
representation of the city but also creates premediated
socio-spatial relations between drivers and riders. As
Uber claims, “navigation means more than just getting
from point A to point B. For example, upon arriving at a
pickup point, drivers then have to find their riders—right
down to what side of the street they’re on” (Uber News-
room, 2017). Participants on UberPeople stated that rid-
ers might give a low rating to the driver who has a bad
navigation, though Uber has recently attempted to ad-
dress this issue. From drivers’ perspective, there are var-
ious reasons that can affect the accuracy of the naviga-
tion system.One example is the driver’s physical location:
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drivers may have inaccurate GPS signals when driving in
the central business district or through tunnels. Hence,
participants suggested that drivers should have knowl-
edge about the city and only drive in the places where
they are familiar with, as they cannot always rely on
the navigation system. Additionally, one major intent for
drivers to use the navigation system is to communicate
and coordinate with riders. This coordination process in-
volves riders’ input of the pick-up location. Nonetheless,
participants found that riders might not enter the most
accurate address, especially in the central business dis-
trict or places with multiple entrances. The “Beginner
Advice” on the forum made a distinction between “safe”
and “unsafe” places when discussing the navigation sys-
tem. The “safe” places mean the location that can easily
identify the rider and stop the car, whereas examples of
“unsafe” places include the places located at the major
intersection with traffic congestion. To manage the im-
perfect navigation system, drivers did turn urban spaces
into meaningful places where they meet riders.
Another set of practices concerns the surge pric-
ing feature. This shows “real-time” demand and sup-
ply of ride-hailing services in the city and determines
when drivers can get higher ride rates due to higher de-
mand. By offering higher rates to drivers working in the
surge area, the mediated location awareness encourages
drivers to work in particular places with high demand.
Rosenblat and Stark (2016) have argued that surge pricing
shows the inaccurate predictive demand of the services,
which can undermine drivers’ autonomy. On the forum,
drivers noted that surge price is based on riders’ rather
than drivers’ location. Even when the drivers’ app shows
surge pricing, drivers need to pay attention to the pop-
up notification regarding the particular ride request be-
cause only that notificationwill determine the actual ride
rate. Therefore, some participants suggested that drivers
should ignore the surge pricing because “surges last for
minutes and there is no guarantee to get a surge job”.
Some even complaining that “Uber creates fake surges”.
Moreover, drivers tried to leverage the data from
the surge pricing maps for their benefit. For example,
drivers could attend to the major events in the city such
as concerts to predict and identify the surge zone before
the app shows the increased surge pricing. As one blog-
ger explained:
What I found that works best is to stay at the outskirts
of the surge zone or to identify a secondary surge
zone….What I found was that I lost a lot of time look-
ing for riders, and then I would have to cancel. By that
time, the surge was over and now I just lost time and
money at this big event. A better strategy is to go a lit-
tle before the event is over and after the big crowd
is gone. It is easier to move in and out of the area
and you can get multiple rides as opposed to one big
ride. Once the surge is gone, I go back to the area
because some people hang out at the bars until they
close. (Castillo, 2017)
Overall, drivers recommended acquiring knowledge
about the city (e.g., the location and time of the major
events) if they want to utilize the surge pricing to max-
imize profit. However, distrust in the mapping system,
again, reveals the complexways driversmustmanagedig-
ital data in their service work.
4.3. Summary and Discussion of the Findings
Grounded in the premise that “automated processes of
data-processing are deeply embedded in” Uber drivers’
daily work (Couldry & Hepp, 2017, p. 126), we argue the
Uber app contributes to themediatization of social space
in several important ways. Algorithms construct a basis
for decision-making, often based on the seemingly “neu-
tral” adaptive statistical techniques that classify the re-
lationship between digital data and users’ feedback and
structure the circulation of information (Rieder, 2017).
Although our goal is not to study the underlying statis-
tical practices that the Uber app relies upon, it is vital to
note that the selection of certain calculative procedures
and the ways of classifying data are deeply social deci-
sions. We suggest that the underlying workings of the
app premediate expectations of service encounters, par-
ticularly the ways that drivers and riders should perform.
We have offered a preliminary assessment of Uber’s dis-
course and drivers’ practices surrounding the rating sys-
tem and location-related metrics. Because of the naviga-
tion system and surge pricing, drivers develop practices
which respond to and circumvent their own data contri-
butions to the system. The sharing of such practices on
UberPeople contributes to the normalization of the so-
cial production of space.
Based on an analysis of UberPeople, we argue Uber
drivers have a distinct algorithmic imaginary, that is,
“ways of thinking about what algorithms are, what they
should be, how they function, and what these imagina-
tions in turn make possible” (Bucker, 2017, p. 40). Our
use of the term “imaginary” aims to highlight digital data
are internalized and forms part of drivers’ understanding
of the repertoire of everydaywork practices. Uber drivers
are aware that digital data, such as their ratings, can affect
their employment opportunities. Therefore, drivers mo-
bilize their algorithmic imaginary to criticize the opaque
methods of calculating and using the performance met-
rics and location-related data. They nonetheless have lim-
ited ability to change the system, due to the informa-
tion and power asymmetries between the company and
drivers. Workers may learn to negotiate with algorith-
mic labor management, as they familiarize with the app
(Shapiro, 2017). On UberPeople, drivers develop strate-
gies to adapt their work practices to the available data to
keep their jobs and maximize their earnings. Drivers also
attempt to validate riders’ performance through quantifi-
able metrics, though they meanwhile denounce the inac-
curacy of the rating system. In other words, drivers take
digital data as a kind of social knowledge and normalize
the idea that they have to learn to live with digital data.
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There are tensions between Uber’s discourse and
drivers’ practices surrounding the Uber app, which con-
tribute to the mediatization of social space and interac-
tions therein. Uber’s discourse regards the data gener-
ated through the navigation and rating systems as “objec-
tive” knowledge that helps drivers to make informed de-
cisions. The location-related metrics, including the data
generated via the navigation system and surge pricing,
not only signify the location of drivers but also visualize
where riders are. The digital map is thus a representation
of the city, based on the algorithmic calculation of the
consumer demand. The Uber app becomes a datafied
space that provides work-related knowledge about the
city and enables social coordination across “calculated”
spaces. Yet, the accuracy of the navigation system is de-
termined by drivers’ physical location. Therefore, drivers
need to manage the imperfect system by acquiring the
knowledge about the city and attaching meanings, such
as familiarity and safety, to physical locations where they
drive. In otherwords, the premediation of drivers’ experi-
ences, the material indispensability of the app itself, and
the normalization of drivers’ social practice converge to
produce social space in a datafied and mediatized world.
Additionally, the rating system is an imperfect sys-
tem that standardizes drivers’ service interactions and
ride-hailing experiences. While Uber attempts to con-
trol drivers’ work performance, drivers simultaneously
develop their norms of interpreting the ratings through
practices of knowledge sharing on the forum. This is not
to suggest that drivers’ practices are resistance to Uber’s
managerial control, but to demonstrate how drivers may
normalize the managerial control and develop reactive
strategies to evade punishment. To qualify as an act of
resistance, the resister’s intention of undermining power-
relations should be recognized by the opposition and
bystanders (Hollander & Einwohner, 2004). In this case,
drivers’ interpretative practices are largely in compliance
with the calculative logics established by Uber. Nonethe-
less, we highlight the interpretative flexibility (Pinch &
Bijker, 1984) of the rating system by attending to how
Uber and drivers ascribemeanings to the system. The rat-
ing system carries not only managerial control over the
drivers but also drivers’ interpretation of riders. The ten-
sions outlined above suggest that digitally-enabled ser-
vice work, analogous to expert fields (Christin, 2017), is a
complex avenue where managerial discourses and work-
ers’ actual practices may differ with one another.
Our preliminary assessments of the management of
the imperfect system can provide insights into the poli-
tics of data. In the workplace, digital data and associated
algorithmic systems embody themanagement’s prescrip-
tive assumptions about the “relevant” knowledge (Gille-
spie, 2014), but they can never fulfill all the needs of
workers. Fromworkers’ perspective, digital data as social
knowledge are always imperfect yet can be used to help
manage risk. By attending toworkers’ practices thatman-
age such imperfectness, we may be able to the power
dynamics mediated by data.
5. Conclusion
This study makes three contributions to the literature
around datafication of the workplace. First, by explor-
ing how Uber drivers interpret the performance and
location-related metrics, we demonstrate how digital
data can construct and set expectations for social inter-
actions. In the wave of datafication, data constitute me-
dia space of social contestation (Couldry & Hepp, 2017).
Our study shows that the Uber drivers negotiate with the
premediation of spatial experience and articulate norms
of social interaction in the datafied space. Second, we
highlight that digitally-enabled service work is a vital site
of encountering and contesting the datafication. Recent
studies have drawn our attention to the importance of
“context” when considering the presumed and actual im-
pacts of algorithms (Bucker, 2017; Christin, 2017). We
suggest the term digitally-enabled service workers to
better incorporate the processes through which digital
data set service workers’ expectations of social interac-
tions and mediate the power dynamics in service work.
In keeping with previous research (Rosenblat & Stark,
2016), we find that Uber deploys information asym-
metries to delimit drivers’ decision-making capabilities.
Drivers develop a distinct algorithmic imaginary based
on the calculative logics of digital data and their peer-
to-peer knowledge about the app and work experiences.
Uber drivers are just one group of gig workers in the pre-
carious and datafied workforce. Further research should
explore how organizational and social differences be-
tween professional workers and service workers shape
their algorithmic imaginaries and the power-relations in
the workplace. Moreover, it is possible that forum partic-
ipants are more familiar with the Uber app than others.
Future studies should explicate whether drivers’ inter-
pretative practices around digital data vary in their skills
and socio-cultural background. Third, extending critiques
over labor practices in the gig economy (Chen, 2017;
Rosenblat & Stark, 2016; van Doorn, 2017), this study
highlights how data become a form of social knowledge
that can favor the company to concentrate the owner-
ship of actionable information and exercise power over
workers. Though drivers’ reactive strategies are far from
resistance to Uber’s managerial control, the online fo-
rum seems to represent a potential place for workers
to create and circulate “worker-generated knowledge”
(Chen, 2017) that may empower drivers to make their
work experiences visible and cultivate their own work-
place culture (Rosenblat, 2018). While the on-demand
business model “currently dominates corporate ‘future
of work’ imaginaries” (van Doorn, 2017, p. 908), it is vi-
tal to explore how workers can possibly counteract algo-
rithmic power of corporate platforms and build a socially
fairer digital economy (e.g., platform cooperativism, see
Scholz, 2017). There are signs that some gig workers en-
gage in digital activism that resists platform algorithms
(e.g., Chen, 2017). Future work should examine work-
ers’ contingent labor conditions in different forms of gig
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work and broader socio-technical contexts that can em-
power workers.
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